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THE RIGHTS OF NEWSPAPER REPORTERS
AND THE PUBLIC WELFARE STANDARD IN
JAPAN
ELLIOTT J. HAHN*
The Constitution of Japan' is one of the most liberal in the
world.2 It "grants an impressive and comprehensive catalogue of
civil liberties" 3 to the Japanese people. Chapter III of the Constitution, denoted "Rights and Duties of the People,"' 4 sets forth a broad
listing of constitutional rights and freedoms. One freedom that is
clearly enshrined in the Constitution of Japan is freedom of the
press. Article 21 makes this freedom explicit, stating: "Freedom of
assembly and association as well as speech, press, and all other
forms of expression are guaranteed. No censorship shall be maintained, nor shall the secrecy of any means of communication be
violated."' This freedom is guaranteed by another constitutional
provision which provides: "These fundamental human rights guaranteed to the people by this Constitution shall be conferred upon
the people of this and future generations as eternal and inviolate
rights. '"6
The Japanese Constitution does, however, allow for a limiting
of the freedom of the press. This freedom is expressly limited by
the requirement that it be exercised for and within the limits of the
"public welfare." Article 12 states that "the freedoms and rights
*
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1. For the full text of the Constitution, see VIII CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES
OF THE WORLD I (A. Blaustein & G. Flanz eds. 1979).
2. One commentator has written that the section dealing with human rights contains
"perhaps the world's most extensive constitutional guarantees of civil rights." Ward, The
Origins of the Present Japanese Constitution, 50 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 980, 1000 (1956).
3. A. OPPLER, LEGAL REFORM IN OCCUPIED JAPAN 59 (1976).
4. This Chapter of "Rights & Duties of the People," it can be argued, is misnamed
since so many of its provisions deal with the rights of the people and so few with their duties.
Of the thirty-one articles in this section, twenty-nine deal with the rights of the people; only
two deal with their duties. This part of the Constitutiuon could more properly be called "the
Many Rights & Few Duties of the People."
5. KENPO (Constitution) art. 21 (Japan), in Blaustein & Flanz, supra note i, at 3.
6. Id. art. I I in Blaustein & Flanz, supra note 1, at 2.
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guaranteed to the people by this Constitution shall be maintained
by the constant endeavor of the people who shall refrain from any
abuse of these freedoms and rights and shall always be responsible
for utilizing them for the public welfare." 7
Whenever the rights of news reporters have been at issue in
Japan, the Japanese Supreme Court has balanced the reporter's
rights against the public welfare standard articulated in Article 12.
The Court has consistently held that the rights of a reporter cannot
oppose the public welfare.' In effect, the Japanese Supreme Court
has established an order of constitutional values which holds the
public welfare standard superior to the rights of news reporters. 9
This rating of constitutional values by the Japanese Supreme
Court has been vehemently criticized by many legal scholars. Ito
Masami, I° a professor of law at the University of Tokyo, has written that the Court's elevation of the public welfare standard to such
a high place means that virtually any law abridging the rights of
reporters could be presumed constitutional on the basis of the public welfare provision. "[W]henever a law is enacted," he explains,
"some kind of danger to the public welfare can be easily found as a
legal regulation would rarely, if ever, be imposed in case no danger
exists."It He argues that freedom of the press in Japan is so crucial
that no presumption of constitutionality should exist as regards a
law abridging rights of this kind.' 2 He cites two reasons for his
statement. The primary one is that a representative democracy
such as Japan's cannot function unless the public can freely and
7. Article I of the Japanese Civil Code reaffirms this emphasis on the public welfare:
1. All private rights shall conform to the public welfare.
2. The exercise of rights and performance of duties shall be done in faith and
in accordance with the principles of trust.
3. No abusing of rights is permissible.
Beer, The Public Welfare Standard and Freedom of Expression in Japan, in THE CONSTITUTION OF JAPAN ITS FIRST TWENTY YEARS, 1947-67 205, 207 (D. Henderson ed. 1968) [hereinafter cited as THE CONSTITUTION OF JAPAN].
8. The Supreme Court has held, for example, that "it is clear from the provisions of
Articles II and 13 of the Constitution that no freedom of expression may oppose the public
welfare." Sakanara v. Tokyo Express Railways, 5 Kakyti Minshi 214, 217 (Sup. Ct., G.B.,
April 4, 1951).
9. Article 13 of the Constitution also declares the public welfare to be of primary importance. It declares the right of the people "to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness...
be the supreme consideration" of government "to the extent that it does not interfere with the
public welfare." Blaustein & Flanz, supra note I,at 2.
10. All Japanese names are written as they are in Japan, i.e., with the surname first.
11. Ito, The Rule of Law: ConstitutionalDepelopment, in LAW IN JAPAN 205, 221 (A.
von Mehren ed. 1963).
12. Id.
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with knowledge choose among political views and candidates
through dissemination of political opinions and views by the newspapers.13 Secondly, he asserts that restriction of the press' freedom
also limits the opportunities for the aggrieved to obtain'relief by the
political process. 4
Ito is not alone in his criticism of the Court. Alfred Oppler, a
member of the Government Section of the Supreme Commander of
the Allied Powers (SCAP) in Japan after World War II, believes
that a Japanese Supreme Court "rigidly oriented toward law and
order could, under this" public welfare criteria, "weaken or even
emasculate" the people's civil liberties. 5 In Oppler's opinion, a
better standard for the Court would be the clear and present danger
test. 16 Similarly, Professor John Maki has written that there is
abundant ground for asserting that the Japanese Supreme Court
has not chosen to act as the watchdog for encroachments of
Japanese constitutional freedoms.' 7
Why has the Japanese Supreme Court chosen to place the public welfare standard on a higher level than freedom of the'press?
This Article examines that issue and shows that the answer lies in
the past, in the history and tradition of Japan. If one traces the
legal and social history of Japan, one sees that the importance of
the group has been considered paramount to that of the individual
for at least the last four centuries. The Meiji Constitution took this
group value and made it part of the law of Japan. By interpreting
the current Constitution in such a way that the public welfare
clause will be elevated above the rights of news reporters if these
two constitutional standards clash, the Japanese Supreme Court
has acted in a manner consonant not only with the Constitution but
also the social and legal history and traditions of Japan.
I.

PRE-CONSTITUTIONAL JAPAN

Prior to 1889 Japan had no constitution.' 8 Although there had
been a codified pronouncement of law, the Jushichi Kempo (the
13. Id.
14.

Id. at 213-14.

15. OPPLER, supra note 3, at 325.
16. Justice Holmes first articulated this view in Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47
(1919).
17. J. MAKI, COURT AND CONSTITUTION IN JAPAN: SELECTED SUPREME COURT DECISIONS, 1948-60, at xl (1964).
18. Japan's first Constitution, promulgated in 1889, is commonly called the Meiji Constitution, named after the then Emperor.
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Constitution of 17 Articles) in 604 A.D., which some considered to
be a constitution, this document was more a code of political and
social moralities than a detailed structure of law. 19
Toward the end of the fourth century A.D. the development of
the Japanese legal system was significantly affected by the introduction of the characters of the Chinese language to Japan. This development was important in that the Japanese, through their
understanding of the Chinese language, were able to absorb much
20
of the Chinese system and culture, including Confucian ethics.
By 1603 the Japanese had combined their interpretation of
Confucian ethics with their own feudal morality to create a legal
system.
Historically, 1603 is a significant date in Japanese history, for
21
it was in that year that Tokugawa Ieyasu was appointed Shagun
by the Emperor, beginning a Tokugawa family rule that was to last
265 years (1603-1868).22 The Tokugawa period, one characterized
by political peace and social stability, is an especially important one
in Japan's legal history. Although the system of law during this
period was feudal, the basic principles of Tokugawa jurisprudence
still exercise a "lingering influence in present-day Japan. ' 2 3
Tokugawa law was rooted in both custom 24 and the Confucian
tenets that had been imported by the Japanese from China and
then reinterpreted in light of their own morality. 25 Throughout the
19. This set of maxims has commonly been attributed to Prince-Regent Umayado (usually referred to as ShOtoku Taishi, the Crown Prince Shatoku). Many recent historians,
though, believe it was not written in 604 A.D. but rather a generation or two later. See G.
SANsoM, A HISTORY OF JAPAN TO 1334, at 51-52 (1958).

20. One writer has called this importation of Chinese ideas by the Japanese a "great
watershed in the development of Japanese law." George, The Right of Silence in Japanese
Law, in THE CONSTITUTION OF JAPAN, supra note 7, at 257.

21. The word Shogun means "General" but is generally used as an abbreviation of SeiiTai-Shogun, a title conferred by the Imperial Court upon military dictators. G. SANSOM,
JAPAN-A SHORT CULTURAL HISTORY 544 (1952).

22. Although the Emperor really had only nonsecular authority at the time, his "ap-

pointment" of leyasu as Shogun gave the Tokugawa family an important legitimacy. Even
though the Shogun in form was only the Emperor's generalissimo, in actuality he wielded the

power of the central government. See, e.g., id at 445-47.
23. Henderson, SomeAspects of Tokugawa Law, 27 WASH. L. REV. 85 (1952).
24. Tokugawa Japan had no constitution. The document called the Buke Shohatto
(Various Regulations for the Military Houses) which was promulgated in 1615 and subsequently reissued in slightly revised forms by later Shoguns upon their accession to power, did
discuss constitutional functions in the English sense. The Buke Shohatto defined the duties
and relationships of the daimyos (i.e., the feudal lords) and the Shogunate. I D. HENDERSON, CONCILIATION AND JAPANESE LAW-TOKUGAWA AND MODERN 31-32, 89 (1965).
25.

Wren, The Legal System of Pre-Western Japan, 20 HASTINGS L.J. 217, 219-21

(1968).
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Tokugawa period this system of law was devoid of almost any foreign influence, for in 1637 the government of the ShOgun, the
Bakufu,2 6 decreed that no Japanese subject could leave the country
or, having left it, return (the penalty for an attempt in'
violation of
the law was death)." In 1639, this policy of seclusion was further
tightened; no foreign ships were allowed to enter Japan.28 Western
books were banned. This national policy of seclusion and exclusion 29 was to remain in effect for over two centuries, until the appearance of Commodore Perry and his famous four Black Ships at
the harbor of Uraga on July 8, 1853.
While these policies were in effect the Tokugawa system flour30
ished. Its basic unit of society was the group, not the individual.
The individual had no legal existence except as part of a group.
The head of the household had total legal control over the persons
and property of the family and was responsible for all the duties,
both public and private, of the family members. 3 1 This principle of
vicarious responsibility was consistently applied up each rung of
the ladder of authority of the Tokugawa local government. Not
only was the village headman, as the head of the group, often punished for crimes of individual members of the village, but fines
were often assessed against the entire village for acts done by an
individual member.3 2 In short, this concept of group responsibility
permeated Tokugawa society.3 3
The stress in Confucian philosophy on family morals and welfare, rather than that of the individual, fit perfectly within the
Tokugawa system, since Confucian philosophy emphasizes that the
26. Bakufu is a Japanese word that literally means "tent government." It came to be
used as a description of the government headquarters of a military dictator. Bakufu is the
word usually used by the Japanese when referring to the governments of successive Shoguns
dynasties. SA.NSOM, supra note 19, at 533.
27. Id at 454.

28. There were two exceptions to this edict. The Dutch and Chinese were allowed to
trade under restricted circumstances at the island of Deshima in Nagasaki Bay. The Dutch
traders could only reside there, and could not travel elsewhere without special permission.
M. HANE, JAPAN: A HISTORICAL SURVEY 149 (1972).
29. The Japanese call this seclusion policy Sakoku (literally, the country in chains).
30. Henderson, supra note 23, at 104.
31. Id

32. Id at 104-05. There were five household groups called the Gonin-gumi, who were
jointly responsible for the acts of each individual member. The Gonin-gumi were vicariously responsible if an individual member of their group committed an offense. If tax payments of a member were in arrears, for example, they had to furnish security for the amount
due. G. SANSON, A HISTORY OF JAPAN 1615-1867 101-02 (1963).
33. Id. at 104.
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individual should not seek to vindicate whatever individual rights
he may possess.34 To insist on asserting one's individual rights is
counter to the Confucian philosophy. Instead, the individual
should seek to establish and maintain harmonious relationships,
because the preservation of that harmonious relationship is believed to be so crucial to society. Thus, Confucianists believe that
"the proper disposition with regard to one's interests is the predisposition to yield rather than the predisposition to insist."3 5 If a dispute arises, one should not seek to appeal to a general rule that will
prove his legal position. Rather, he should seek to find the compromise solution that will promote the greatest harmony among the
parties.36 Compromise is posited by Confucianists as the greatest
virtue. The letter of the law is not nearly as important as saving the
"face" of the disputants, even if one party is clearly in the wrong.37
Nearly all disputes are to be settled by compromise.3 8
Confucianism also emphasizes loyalty. This stress on loyalty
came to characterize every known relationship in Tokugawa society." 9 Each inferior in Tokugawa society-and societal status was
clearly delineated 4 -- owed a duty of loyalty to his superior.
34. HENDERSON, supra note 24, at 40-42.

35. Schwartz, On Attitudes Toward Law in China, in M. KATZ, GOVERNMENT UNDER
LAW AND THE INDIVIDUAL 29 (1957).

36. Wren, Japanese Law or Logic, 68 CASE & CoM. 36 (Nov.-Dec. 1963).
37. This factor is still present in Japan today, although in a more limited fashion. See
id. In that article, the author describes a collision she witnessed between a bus and a bicycle
in Japan. Although the bicycle driver clearly was in the wrong, the matter was settled so that
no party suffered "dishonor."
38. See HENDERSON, supra note 24, at 132-62 in which Professor Henderson relates the
details of a dispute during the Tokugawa period and shows the enormous pressure employed
by Shagunate officials to settle such disputes.
39. Henderson, supra note 23, at 105.
40. Professor Henderson has written that Tokugawa Society was stratified with classes
within classes. The society's fundamental principle was that men are born unequal and they
should be treated unequally. He breaks up Tokugawa society in this way (from the apex
down):
(I) the Emperor
(2) the Shogun
(3) the Kuge (Imperial Court Nobles)
(4) the Buke (military nobility)
(a) Daimy6 (the word refers to the great feudal lords of Japan who ruled fiefs
of over 10,000 koku of rice, a koku being about five bushels and the standard unit
of value in Tokugawa Japan. Most historians believe that a koku was in general
adequate to satisfy one person at that time for one year).
(b) Samurai (ruled fiefs of under 10,000 koku of rice).
(5) hyakusho (farmers)
(6) shokunin (artisans)
(7) shonin (merchants)
(8) eta (the outcasts)
(9) hinin (the beggars)
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The Tokugawa government used Confucian ethics to reinforce
the values implicit in their system of government.4 ' Confucianism
became the orthodox official philosophy of Tokugawa Japan.4 2 In
fact, Sir George Sansom, a renowned historian of the Tokugawa
era, has written that in the Tokugawa period "Confucianism may
almost be regarded as having the position of an established
religion." '43

This emphasis by the Tokugawa government on

Confucianism was not misplaced; although the philosophy is Chinese in origin, it had so permeated the Japanese system during the
Tokugawa period that 4it4 was universally regarded by the Japanese
as being "Nihon-teki.

There was, as one legal scholar has written, a "remarkable correspondence between the real world as viewed from the Edo castle
[i.e., the home of the ShOgun].

.

.and the natural-law order envis-

aged by orthodox Confucianism. ' 45 The union of the authoritarian
Tokugawa system and Confucian philosophy was totally compatible and guaranteed the perpetuation of the values emphasized concurrently by the two systems. The emphasis on the group rather
than the individual, on a rigidly stratified social order characterized
by loyalty to the group and to one's superior, on duties instead of
rights, and on the reluctance of the individual to press for vindication of his rights, were all values deeply impressed on Japanese society by the Tokugawa government and Confucianism working in
tandem.46 Furthermore, the absence of foreign influence on Japan
during virtually all of the Tokugawa period 47 meant that no Western concept of "individual rights" or of the law in general could
penetrate the borders of Japan. No countervailing foreign influences could threaten the strength of these Japanese values, and the
island of Japan became a nation of homogeneous values.4 8 In fact,
Id at 92-93.
41. See Wren, supra note 25, at 221.
42. HENDERSON, supra note 24, at 37.
43. SANSOM, supra note 21, at 505.
44. This phrase means "that which is essentially Japanese." It has five connotations:
(1)what prevails in Japan; (2) what is good for Japan; (3) what concerns Japan; (4) the
Japanese point of view; (5) the fundamental spirit of Japan. Wren, supra note 25, at 221 n.6.
45. HENDERSON, supra note 24, at 47.
46. Id. at 48-49.
47. See note 29 supra.
48. "With few exceptions Japanese political thinkers of the Tokugawa period shared
certain basic assumptions. It mattered little whether their primary allegiance was to Buddhism, Neo-Confucianism, or Shinto. All saw the state as an ethical order; all lacked a
R. MINEAR, JAPANESE TRADIconcept of law comparable to that found in the West.
TION AND WESTERN LAW 148 (1970).
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because of these values the lack of a consciousness of individual
rights was so strong that the Japanese language had no word or
phrase that corresponded to the Western concept of "individual
rights" until the late nineteenth century.4 9
The entrance of Commodore Matthew Perry and his Black
Ships5" into Shimoda Bay in 1853 marked the beginning of the demise of the Tokugawa government. Internal forces had already
been at work eroding the foundations of the system, and the Tokugawa laws, geared to a static, isolated, and feudal society, were inadequate to cope with the fundamental commercial and social
changes taking place in Japan. 5 1 By the 1860's the once-solid
Tokugawa system was crumbling. On January 3, 1868, the Tokugawa rule ended with the establishment of a new central government in the name of the Emperor Meiji; this marked the beginning
of the era called the Meiji Restoration.52
The values of the Tokugawa system lasted long beyond the
demise of the Tokugawa era. These values, especially those of the
primacy of the group and the reluctance of individuals to assert
their rights, continue to strongly influence Japan. In pre-1945 Japan these two values, ones directly attributable to the influence of
Confucianism and the Tokugawa system, helped to create a situation whereby the concept of individual civil liberties had little importance.5 3 Instead, the traditional value system of Japan
emphasized contrary values - subordination of the individual to
the group and the predisposition of the individual to desist from
49. The Chinese, from whom the Japanese imported Confucianism and its emphasis on

duty, loyalty to one's superior, and the lack of a consciousness of individual rights, similarly
had no word at this time that would correspond to the Western notion of "individual rights."
See HozuMI N., THE NEW JAPANESE CIVIL CODE AS MATERIAL FOR THE STUDY OF COM-

quoted in Blakemore, Post-War Developments in Japanese
Law, 1947 WIS. L. REV. 632, 649 n.79.
50. The Japanese were astonished at the sight of Perry's ships which billowed black
clouds of smoke. They thought that the "barbarians" had harnessed volcanoes. Thus, they
PARATIVE JURISPRUDENCE (1912),

called Perry's fleet "the black ships." H. BORTON, JAPAN'S MODERN CENTURY 27 (1955).

5 I. Henderson, supra note 23, at 91. The social system, for example, soon became totally inconsonant with the economic situation. As trade grew in Japan, the merchant class
acted as bankers and their economic power grew while that of the samurai class fell. Yet, the
social situation of the two classes in a highly stratified system was wildly disparate from the
economic realities. See SANSOM, supra note 21, at 517-28. Some historians believe that the
feudal Tokugawa system simply could not cope with the emergence of capitalism in Japan.
The "kozama" historians such as Hattori Shiso, Hirano Yoshitaro, and Toyama Shigeki view
the Meiji Restoration as the victory of the feudal-capitalist alliance in a class struggle with
the peasantry and "urban proletariat."
52. See G. BECKMANN, THE MAKING OF THE MEIJI CONSTITUTION I (1957).
53. See, e.g., R. MINEAR, JAPANESE TRADITION AND WESTERN LAW 172 (1970).
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asserting or vindicating his rights.5 4 The strength of these traditional values has continued for almost 400 years and has greatly
affected Japanese society and its legal system's view of individual
rights, including the view of the Japanese Supreme Court.
II.

FREEDOM OF THE PRESS UNDER THE MEIJI CONSTITUTION

The Meiji Restoration brought a termination to the Tokugawa
policy of seclusion. Japan's self-imposed isolation ended, and the
Japanese people were exposed to Western ideas. One Western enterprise which was readily integrated into Japanese society was the
modern newspaper. 5
By 1870 the first Japanese daily newspaper, the Yokohama
Mainichi Shimbun appeared.56 Less than ten years later there were
nearly 300 newspapers in Japan and their combined yearly circulation was an astronomical 38,000,000 copies. 7 Newspapers soon
played an important role in the political process by mobilizing
public opinion. The oligarchs of Japan, people such as Kido Koin,
Okubo Toshimichi, and Ito Hirobumi became incensed as the papers began to openly discuss various political issues. 58 They feared
that their privileged position might be lost if newspapers were allowed to continue expressing their opinions. This perceived threat
was further heightened by the adoption of the principle of universal
education in 1872"9 (and the consequential rapid rise in literacy).
In an effort to curb the activities of newspaper writers the government introduced a series of press laws.
54. HENDERSON, supra note 24, at 47-62.
55. Actually, the present Japanese newspaper can trace its origin to the "yomiuri"
(news-sheet). The yomiuri, however, consisted of only one sheet of news or a leaflet, and was
far from being a modern newspaper since it was only printed sporadically. It was printed
from a block and sold in the streets by a vendor who read the contents of the yomiuri aloud
and in this way attracted the interest of passers-by. The yomiuri began in the seventeenth
century. See A. ALTMAN, THE EMERGENCE OF THE PRESS IN MEIJI JAPAN 4 (1966) and J.
HAYASAKA, AN OUTLINE OF THE JAPANESE PRESS 1 (1938). When Townsend Harris, the
first American Ambassador to Japan, arrived there in the late 1850's, printed accounts of him
with illustrated drawings were circulated by the thousands. Harris wrote that these accounts
were "not in the form of newspapers but are analogous to the 'broadsheets and little books'
that preceded that mighty engine - the newspaper." T. HARRIS, THE COMPLETE JOURNAL
OF TOWNSEND HARRIS 400 (1968).
56. In 1862, even before the Meiji Restoration, the Bakufu had ordered its Foreign Language Investigation Office to translate Dutch Newspapers published in Batavia, Java. Soon,
newspapers such as the Japan Commercial News and Japan Times were being published by
Occidentials in Yokohama. BORTON, supra note 50, at 185.
57. Id
58. K. KAWABE, THE PRESS AND POLITICS IN JAPAN 60 (1921).
59. BECKMANN, supra note 52, at 44.
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In 1873 the first repressive measures against the press were initiated by the Japanese government. In that year a press law was
issued which required newspapers to obtain an official authorization to publish.60 In addition, the law prohibited any comment at
all by the press upon government officials while they served in office. Editorials opposing governmental policies were also banned,
as were discussions of laws by reporters. 6 '
In 1875 criticism by the press 62 enraged the oligarchs and convinced them that the measures enacted in 1873 were ineffectual. As
a result, the oligarchs repealed the 1873 law and enacted the draconian Libel Law and Press Law of June 28, 1875.63 This law ushered
Japan into an age of strict censorship.
The Press Law of 1875 made it a crime for newspapers to criticize governmental policy.' Both the editor of the newspaper and
the writer of the article could be punished for such an offense by a
fine or imprisonment. The newspapers did not submit easily to
such a repressive measure and circumvented this law by hiring
dummy "editors" (called by the public "prison editors").6 5 These
people paid the fine and served the prison sentence while the paper
continued publication.6 6 The government disliked this loophole
and barely one year later acted to remedy this weakness in the law.
In 1876 the law was amended to give the Minister of Home Affairs
the power to delay or even suppress a newspaper's publication.6 7
The criminal penalties of fines and imprisonment remained part of
the law. The new law was strictly enforced, and by the end of 1876
forty-nine editors and reporters had been fined or imprisoned or
both.68
60. The Education Law of 1872 established compulsory elementary school education in
Japan.
61. BECKMANN, supra note 52, at 44-45.
62. For example, in June of 1875 the oligarchs of the Meiji government were considering establishing in Japan some form of constitutional government, and an assembly of prefectural governors was convened to discuss this matter. The oligarchs allowed two delegates
representing the people to be admitted. The oligarchs believed this assembly to be a gesture
of democratic beneficence by them to the people. The press, unintimidated by the Press Law
of 1873, refused to laud the oligarchs' act. Instead, they criticized this arrangement as inadequate. See Colegrove, The Japanese Constitution, 31 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 1027, 1036 (1937).
63. The Zamboritsu (Libel Law) and the Shimbunshi Jorei (Press Law) were promulgated in the Dajokwan Fukoku, or "Notifications of the Dajokwan," No. 110 and I 11,(July
28, 1875), reprinted in MCLAREN, JAPANESE GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS 5397-40.
64. Id.
65. BORTON, supra note 50, at 186.
66. Id.
67. Id
68. Professor Beckmann in The Making ofthe Me66i Constitution puts this figure at sixty.
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During the early years of the Meiji era the adoption of a constitution emerged as an important issue.69 By 1881 popular demand for reform had grown so strong that the Emperor promised
the Japanese people a constitution and a parliament." Motivated
by a desire to first consolidate their own position and power,"' the
oligarchs, however, continually cautioned against hastily writing a
constitution. The democratic movement was incensed by the oligarchs' delay, and their insistence on the prompt writing of a constitution was echoed-and even amplified-by the press.7 2 The
oligarchs were enraged at this criticism of their inaction and again
looked to enact harsher measures against the press. This desire to
control the press was intensified by the press' effort to fully and
freely report about a revolt against the Meiji government by a
73
group of discontented samurai.
New laws were enacted in 1883 and 1885 which required each
paper to deposit 1000.yen with the Ministry of Home Affairs.7 4
This money was forfeited each time the Ministry decided that an
article was contrary to the public welfare.7 5 Nevertheless, newspapers proliferated and their influence grew.76 However, the oligarchs' need to repress them diminished as the democratic
movement so fervently supported by most newspapers lost much of
its effective force.7 7 In addition, by 1885 the oligarchs had quietly
implemented measures to reorganize the government structure and
had drafted a constitution which would safeguard their political
power.78 Consequently, a revised press law was issued in 1887
which, for the first time, modified the strict control of the press.
However, most historians believe the correct number to be forty-nine. See HANE, supra note
28, at 308.
69. BECKMANN, supra note 52, at 26.
70. Id. at 53.
71. Id. at 58-60.
72. Id. at 46 n.24.
73. Colegrove, supra note 62, at 1037.
74.

BORTON, supra note 50, at 186.

75. Id.
76. In 1883, for example, there were 199 newspapers in Japan. By 1890, this number
had risen to 716. HANE, supra note 28, at 308.
77. Splits within the leadership of the democratic forces in Japan had a seriously deleterious effect on their image in the eyes of the general public. See BECKMANN, supra note 52,
at 65-68.
78. The Emperor Meiji had earlier in 1873 approved the suggestion of Kido Koin, one
of the oligarchs, that a constitution be considered. He appointed two other oligarchs, Ito
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The new law eliminated the 1000 yen deposit requirement and only
required the prospective publisher to inform the ministry of his intent to publish.7 9 The Ministry of Home Affairs was declared the
sole governmental power capable of suppressing newspapers or
confiscating the plant where they were published. 0 This provision
lessened governmental control over the press since it stripped the

prefectural authorities of their powers."'
The oligarchs realized that social, economic, and military reforms were needed 2 if Japan was to prove to the West that she was
a modern nation. In an effort to establish her status as a modern
nation, and to have the insulting treaty provisions imposed by the
West lifted, 3 Japanese leaders 4 travelled abroad. They realized
that to accomplish these goals many of the West's systems had to
be imported into Japan 8 -including a Western legal system.
One large problem in importing a Western legal system was
that there was no concept of "individual rights" in Japan.8 6 In fact,
Hirobumi and Terajima Munenori, to make a general study of constitutional governments.
At Ito's urging, Kido wrote a draft constitution.
The fundamental principle of Kido's draft was that "to each person there are reserved
certain inherent rights conferred by heaven." One of these inherent rights was freedom of
speech. There were, though, certain strong qualifications to this freedom. Slander of the
government or fellow citizens, for example, was prohibited. Newspapers could not be published without the permission of the government. Publishers were to be held strictly liable
for articles in their newspapers. This "freedom" could also be suspended in whole or in part
in time of war.
Kido's draft was rejected, though. Okubo asserted to Ito and Terajima that Japan was
in a transition from a feudal state to a modern nation. He argued that imperial absolutism
was needed to facilitate this transformation so that Japan could reach as quickly as possible
a position of equality with the West. Attracted by Prussian concepts of government and
Bismark's strong leadership, Okubo believed that an absolute government led by a capable
oligarchy was both consistent with Japanese tradition and in her best interests. Ito and Terajima, influenced by Okubo, came to the same viewpoint. Id at 26-38.
79. Id. at n. 46.
80. Id.
81. Id at 64.
82. See id at 22.
83. These provisions were regarded by the Japanese as a slur to their sovereignty for
two reasons. One reason was that the treaties provided a foreigner alleged to have committed a crime on Japanese soil, was to be tried not by the Japanese, but by the courts of his own
nation. The second reason was that the treaties forced Japan to accept very low preset duty
and custom rates. See Weil & Glick, Japan-Is the Market Open? A View of the Japanese
Market Drawnfrom Corporate Experience, II LAW. & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 845, 851 (1979).
The extraterritoriality provision was imposed, inter alia, because the Western nations believed the Japanese did not have a modern legal system.
84. See Mukai & Toshitani, The Progress and Problems of Compiling the Civil Code in
the Early Meff Era, in I LAW IN JAPAN: AN ANNUAL 25, 30-33 (D. Henderson ed. 1967).
85. Id.
86. Cf. note 49 supra.
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the Japanese language had no word at this time that would express
per se the western concept of individual rights.8 7 Thus, when
Mitsukuri Rinsha was commissioned to translate the French Civil
Code into Japanese for possible adoption in Japan, he was stumped
as to how the French expression "droits civil" could be translated
into Japanese. Mitsukuri described the situation in this way:
whereupon at that time I translated the words droits civil as
minken [people's powers or authority] there was an argument
over what did I mean by saying that the people have power
[ken]. Even though I tried to justify it as hard as I could, there
was an extremely furious argument ....88
Mitsukuri's recitation of this episode indicates how difficult it was
for the oligarchs to accept the concept of people having "rights."
"Kenri," the word that Mitsukuri eventually decided to use as the
Japanese equivalent of "droits civil" has kept the meaning given it
by Mitsukuri.8 9
On February 11, 1889, the Meiji Constitution was promulgated. 90 The basic premise of the constitution was the doctrine that
supreme political power rested in the person of the Emperor. 9 ' The
Emperor was the center of political power, not by divine right, but
rather by divine descent. The Preamble to the Constitution stated
that "the rights of sovereignty of the State, We have inherited from
Our Ancestors, and We shall bequeath them to our descendants." 92
Article 4 of the Constitution added that "the Emperor is the head of
the Empire, combining in himself the rights of sovereignty, and he
exercises them according to the provisions of the present Constitution."9 3
The Meiji Constitution did grant to the people a limited degree
of freedom of the press. Article XXIX declared that "Japanese subjects shall, within the limits of law, enjoy the liberty of speech, writ87. Noda, Nihon-Jin No Seikaku To Sono Ho-Kannen (The Character of the Japanese
People and their Conception of Law), 140 Misuzu 2, 14-26 (1971), translated and quoted in
THE JAPANESE LEGAL SYSTEM 305 (Tanaka H. ed. 1976) [hereinafter cited as Tanaka].
88. Mukai & Toshitani, supra note 84, at 38 n.23.
89. Tanaka, supra note 87, at 305.
90. The Meiji Constitution was promulgated on February 11,1889, to coincide with the
observation of an important date in Japanese history. That day is the National Festival of
Kigensetsu, or the anniversary of the founding of the Japanese Empire by Japan's first emperor, Jimmu Tenno. HOZUMI N., ANCESTOR-WORSHIP AND JAPANESE LAW 75 (1912).
91.

CONSTITUTION OF THE EMPIRE OF JAPAN 1889, reprinted in MCLAREN, JAPANESE

GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS 136-44.

92. Id.
93. Id.
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ing, publication, public meetings, and associations."9 4 To the
Japanese at that time this provision was an important development
in the evolution of freedom of the press.9 5 Never before had this
freedom been recognized so explicitly. Yet, at the same time it is
especially important to realize how limited freedom of the press
was under this provision. By the wording of Article XXIX, freedom of the press was not recognized as a fundamental right. This
point is clear from the method by which it was guaranteed "within
the limits of the law."96 By this language, any law limiting the
press' freedom was constitutional. Since the Meiji Constitution did
not allow judicial review of the constitutionality of legislation by
either the regular courts 97 or the administrative ones,98 the power of
the government to limit whatever freedom the press possessed was
totally unfettered. Thus, the freedom of the press delineated in Article XXIX was more verbiage than reality.
Even the language of Article XXIX, however, was considered
too liberal by some of the oligarchs. When the Constitution was
presented to the Emperor's Privy Council some of its members proposed that the title of the civil rights section be changed from
"Rights and Duties of Subjects" to "Responsibility of Subjects."9 9
They argued that since the Japanese citizens could have nothing
but the responsibility of a loyal status of subjection in relation to
the Emperor, it would be improper to imply anything else by using
the word "rights" in this context." °
The contrast between the concept articulated by the Meiji
Constitution of heaven-given state rights and state-given human
rights, and the Western idea of heaven-given human rights and
people-given state rights is striking. Even to mention an ideology
of fundamental human rights under the Meiji Constitution was to
question the very legitimacy of the government.' 0 ' Hozumi
94. Id.
95. Cf. Comment, IndividualCivil Liberties and the JapaneseConstitution, 14 TULSA L.J.
515, 520 (1979).
96. MCLAREN, supra note 91.
97. Great Court of Judicature Judgment, Decision of March 3, 1937, 16 Keishu 193.
98. Administrative Court Judgment, Decision of December 27, 1927, 38 Gyoroku 1330.
There were a few legal scholars who believed that the courts had the power of judicial review. See, e.g., VESUGI S., KEMPO JUKTSUGI (Explanations on the Constitution) 602 (I Ith
ed. 1922). Their views were in the minority and not endorsed by the courts.
99. Ukai, The Individualand the Rule of Law Under the New Japanese Constitution, 5I
Nw. U. L. REV. 733 (1957). See also Abe, CriminalJustice in Japan. Its HistoricalBackgroundand Modern Problems, 47 A.B.A.J. 555, 557-58 (1961).
100. Id.
101. Minobe Tatsukichi, Professor of Constitutional Law at Tokyo University, was bit-
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Yatsuka, an important interpreter of the Meiji Constitution, 0 2
wrote that rights such as "freedom" of the press were dependent in
the long run upon the will and bent of the government. His thinking reflects the standard political beliefs of the Meiji era:
The "rights of subjects" presented in the Constitution are
not heaven-given rights, nor the right to resist state rights; they
amount to no more than the right to avoid excessive use of intervention by the administration dependent upon the guarantees of
that Constitution (State Rights). Following long-established custom, they were clearly represented in the text of the Constitution
as examples, but they do not actually possess great initial significance.

.

.The present Constitution
has not adopted the idea of
10 3

heaven-given human rights.
The Meiji Constitution was the culmination in Japan of the
societal emphasis on loyalty to one's superiors that had been used
in Japan's feudal period by the Tokugawa government to enhance
its own system through its stress on Confucian philosophy and values. '4The Meiji government transformed this emphasis on loyalty
to one's superiors into a spirit of super-patriotism based upon loyalty to the Emperor, the very incarnation of Japan.'0 In 1890 the
Imperial Rescript on Education stressed to the people that one of
the foundations of the Japanese system was this underlying theme
of loyalty to the Emperor:
Be filial to your parents, affectionate to your brothers and
sisters; as husbands and wives be harmonious; as friends true;
bear yourselves in modesty and moderation; . . . always respect
the Constitution and observe the laws; should emergency arise,
offer yourselves courageously to the State; and thus guard and
maintain the prosperity of our Imperial Throne coequal with
heaven and earth.l°6
terly attacked, for his "Emperor as an organ" theory. He asserted that the Emperor was only
an organ of the State and that his purpose was limited to exercising sovereignity. See Nagao,
The Legal Philosophy of Taisukichi Minobe, in 5 LAW IN JAPAN: AN ANNUAL 165 (1972).
102. See F. MILLER, MINOBE TADSUKICHi 26 (1965).
103. HOZuMI, N., SHUSEI ZoHo KEMPO TEIYo (A Constitutional Law Summary) 13-21
(1935), quoted in Ishida, Fundamental Human Rights and the Development ofLegal Thought in
Japan, in 8 LAW IN JAPAN: AN ANNUAL 39, 42-43 (1975).
104. BECKMANN, supra note 52, at 94-95.

105. During this period, the word "kokutai" was used by many Japanese to express this
idea. This word has no exact counterpart in English, but can be roughly translated as the
concept of "the essence of Japan which has made her nationhood so superior." See, e.g., W.
BEASLEY, THE MEIJI RESTORATION 429 (1972).

106. Under this overriding concept of the Emperor as the father of Japan and the Japanese people as his children, the freedom of the press described in Article XXIX was more
verbiage than reality. Not only did the constitutional provision explicitly state that this free-
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This interpretation of Confucian philosophy was an attempt
by the Meiji government to put new vigor into the concept of the
Emperor as the father of Japan and the Japanese people as his children. The people owed the Emperor loyalty; he, in turn, would exercise paternal beneficence to guard their welfare. In this way the
Meiji government equated political obligations with filial piety.
There would thus be no conflict between family and state, since
loyalty to the state and filial piety were one and the same. 107
In reality, there was no weapon in the Meiji Constitution--or
in the underlying political thought of Japan-which could protect
0 8
the freedom of the press from encroachment by the government.
During the existence of the Meiji Constitution the ability of the
press to report freely on matters was severely circumscribed by the
Japanese government. In 1909, for instance, the Minister of Home
Affairs was given the power to prohibit the sale or the distribution
of newspapers and to seize them if he found that they disturbed
security and order or injured morality.0 9 His determination, moreover, was nonreviewable." 0o
Through the end of World War 11 the government of Japan
often used its powers under the Meiji Constitution to restrict severely the ability of the press to report matters."' Any article by
the press that, in the eyes of the government, tended to subvert the
political institutions of Japan, lead to a breach of the peace, or was2
contrary to good morals, was punishable by criminal penalties."
The ambiguity of this law gave the government even more control
over the press since one cannot define with specificity what characterizes an article that "tends" to subvert the political institutions of
Japan, "leads" to a breach of the peace, or is "contrary" to good
morals.' ' 3 Thus, the press often had to function as its own censor
to avoid transgressing a law which had such unclear parameters. " 4
dom of the press was enjoyed by the Japanese people "within the limits of the law," but there
was no check on the power of the government to limit this freedom. The constitution clearly
stated that the courts had no power to review an alleged infringement of constitutional rights
by the government. BORTON supra note 50, at 177-78.
107. Id.
108. Cf. G. UYEHARA, THE POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT OF JAPAN 1867-1909 132 (1910).
109. Law No. 41 of 1909.
110. Id.
Ill. F. GIBNEY, JAPAN THE FRAGILE SUPER POWER 253 (1980).
112. Law No. 36 of March 10, 1900.
113. GIBNEY, supra note 11, at 253.
114. The Yomiuri Shimbun newspaper avoided government censorship for a time by simply not reporting political news. GIBNEY, supra note 11l, at 252.
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The press' ability to do investigative reporting of governmental
matters was also severely curtailed. Governmental documents concerning diplomatic, military, or other state matters which were not
publicly released by the government could not be made public by
the press.' 15 The Ministers of War, Navy, and Foreign Affairs were
authorized by statute to prohibit publication in the press of matters
they unilaterally decided should not be made public.' 16 The freedom of newspapers to report on these matters was truly nonexistent
since the government could, at its whim, with no outside body having the power to confirm the validity of its judgment, decide a matter should not be mentioned in the newspapers because of an
undisclosed diplomatic or military reason. ,,
Laws enacted pursuant to the Meiji Constitution explicitly
protected the Imperial Family from libel." 8 Until the Penal Code
was revised in 1907, it was a crime to insult members of the government in the press."'9 Newspapers or magazines engaging in defamation first became specifically liable to criminal penalties in
1875. 120
One writer, Professor Lawrence Beer, has asserted that compared to the other restrictions placed upon it by the government in
this period, "Japanese press freedom was recognized to a significant
account" in pre-World War II defamation law.' 2' To support his
statement he points to Article 23 of the Newspaper Ordinance of
1887 which stated that there was no liability for defamation if the
were made
newspaper could prove that its allegations were true and
22
intent.'
malicious
without
and
benefit
for the public's
During the period of roughly 1873-1930, the press and the government were often at odds. 12 3 Frequently the press, by incessantly
bitter and violent attacks on the government, would whip the popu115. See Miyaoka, The Safeguard of Civil Liberi' in Japan, 4 A.B.A.J. 604. 617 (1918).
Those interested in the thoughts of the Japanese during this period on the subject of freedom
of the press in Japan would be well-advised to read this article. Mr. Miyaoka, a member of
the Japanese bar in 1918, argues that there is really no restriction imposed on the legitimate
enjoyment of freedom of the press in Japan, since these limitations are for the good of the
country.
\116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Beer, Defamation, Privacy,and Freedom of Expression in Japan, in 5 LAW IN JAPAN:
AN ANNUAL 192, 198 (1975).

119.
120.
121.
122.

The Penal Code of Japan, arts. 230-32 (Law No. 45 of 1907).
Beer, supra note 118, at 198.
Id at 198-99.
Id at 198.

123.

GIBNEY, supra note I11 , at 252.
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lace into such an agitated state that mass meetings would be held in
opposition to the government's policy.' 24 To counter this groundswell of opposition the government would move to control the
newspapers. The more violent the press' attack, the more vigorous
the government's suppression of the freedom of the press. For example, at the conclusion of the Russo-Japanese War the government of Prime Minister Katsura was bitterly denounced by many
newspapers which contended that the terms of the Portsmouth
Treaty were unsatisfactory to Japan. 2 5 Inflamed by the press' virulent attacks on the Katsura government, a mass of people assembled in Hibiya Park in Tokyo. 126 The crowd became violent and
burned police stations and government buildings. Destruction became rampant, and the government was forced to declare marital
law.' 2 7 In retaliation, the Katsura government imposed a policy of
rigid censorship on all newspapers. No articles could be printed
which, in the government's view, threatened the maintenance of or129
der.' 2 8 This policy of strict censorship lasted three months.

A similar situation occurred in the spring of 1914 when four
officials in the Japanese Navy were convicted of taking bribes from
the Siemens and Schuckert Company. The Japanese public was
shocked; here-to-fore they had considered military officials to be
30
patriots, unselfishly dedicating their lives to the service of Japan.
At an anti-government rally occasioned by the revelations, a reporter was struck with a saber by a policeman. The newspapers
124. See, e.g., S. OKAMOTO, THE JAPANESE OLIGARCHY AND THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR
(1970).
125. The policy of the government during the Meiji era of not revealing information to
the public through the newspapers for military or diplomatic reasons backfired in this case.
At the urging of the newspapers, the Japanese public had pressed for war against the Russians. Once war broke out such great Japanese successes as the overwhelming defeat of the
Russian fleet at Port Arthur had led the public to conclude that a great victory was near.
Unknown to them, however, the Japanese had few trained officers, weapons, or financial
reserves left. The Russians, on the other hand, had just started to shift their prized military
forces from Western Europe to the Far East. These factors moved the Japanese military
leaders to press the government for a negotiated result to the war. Not possessed of this
information, the Japanese newspapers and public were shocked at the terms of the Portsmouth Treaty. They believed that the government had negotiated a peace at terms advantageous to Russia when a great victory was near. Id.; J. WHITE, THE DIPLOMACY OF THE
RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR 317 (1964).

126. GIBNEY, supra note
127. Id.
128.

111, at 56.

K. HANAZANO, THE DEVELOPMENT OF JAPANESE JOURNALISM 51 (1924).

129. The press attacks on the Katsura government, though, had been so effective that the
government was forced to resign on January 7, 1906.
130. KAWABE supra note 58, at 142.
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jointly expressed their outrage at this injury by asking the Minister
of the Interior, Hara Kei, to apologize. 13 1 Hara refused. Believing
the attack to have been a deliberate one, the press vehemently criticized the government. The government responded by punishing
every newspaper in Tokyo' 3 2 and forcing three newspapers to suspend publication.' 3 3
Japanese governments obviously did not hesitate to use the
34
censorship powers they possessed under the Meiji Constitution.
In fact, the Japanese government exercised their most rigorous
censorship during the 1930's and throughout World War II. Frank
Gibney, a renowned commentator on Japanese affairs has written
that "as the militarist trend in Japan grew stronger, the papers had
35 The government
increasingly less latitude in which to oppose."'
kept a watchful eye on publications that might put any organ of the
136
Japanese government, especially the military, in a bad light.
Those newspapers deemed to be most critical of the government's
emphasis on militarism were penalized severely: they had their
share of newsprint reduced. 137 It became commonplace for newspaper articles to have many lines deleted. 138 By using these diverse
tools of censorship the Japanese government forced those newspapers most offensive to them to cease publication. By 1940 more
39 This atthan 500 publishers had been forced out of business.
mosphere of intimidation paid immediate dividends for the government. Japan's brutal successes in China in the late 1930's were
hailed by the hitherto anti-militarist Japanese newspapers as the
131. Id.
132. Id
133. As in the case of the Katsura government, the government was eventually forced to
resign.
134. The following chart gives the number of newspapers in 1913 and 1914 which were
GIVEN
censored by the Japanese government:
YEAR

SALE FORBIDDEN

SUSPENDED

OTHERS

FINED

WARNING

103
197
5
2
74
1913
194
114
2
1
453
1914*
*The greater amount of newspapers whose sales were prohibited in 1914, the beginning
of World War I, is due, inter alia, to their publication of matters considered by the Japanese
government to be military or diplomatic secrets.
See additionally HANE, supra note 28, at 397, and HANAZANO, supra note 128, at 54.
135.

GIBNEY, supra note 11, at 253.

136.
137.
138.
139.

Id.
See HANE, supra note 28, at 499.
Id.
Id
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"glorious" victories of the "righteous" Japanese army. 14 0
During the period of growing militarism in Japan that began
in the late 1920's, the Japanese press did not always criticize the
government's emphasis on militarism. On the contrary, a large proportion of the press often berated the government for making what
it believed to be concessions to the West and to China. For example, in April, 1930, upon the insistence of Prime Minister
Hamaguchi Osachi, Japan became one of the signatories of the
London Naval Treaty.14' This agreement had provisions which declared that Japan would build no battleships for six years and
would maintain a smaller navy than the United States. 142 The
press reacted furiously. It agreed with the objections of the Navy
and much of Parliament that the sixty percent ratio imposed on
Japan's Navy as compared to the United States' was too low a parity for Japan to maintain an adequate defense. 143 Much of the
press also heatedly criticized the policy of conciliation to China
pushed by Hamaguchi and his Foreign Minister Shidehara
Kijuro.',
Immediately after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor the
government of Prime Minister TOjO enacted an emergency law
which provided, inter alia, that no war news could be reported by a
newspaper without the approval of the Japanese Supreme Command. 145 In the early stages of World War II when the war situation was proceeding most advantageously for Japan, news reports
were released without much interference. However, as the war out46
look became bleaker, censorship was applied with a heavy hand. 1
By the end of World War II the Japanese government zealously
attempted, usually with great success, to control what reporters
could write, thus controlling the public's basic perception of events
in Japan (and, indeed, in the world) and the policies of the Japanese government. This lack of freedom of the press-indeed, its
complete absence-had an enormous influence on the Japanese
public. One historian has written that: "military successes were ex140. Id
141. See BORTON, supra note 50, at 315.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id at 316.
145. HANE, supra note 28, at 499. In March of 1938 the Diet paved the way for passage
of this law by enacting the National General Mobilization Act. This statute allowed the
government to place the press under strict censorship in time of war or during "incidents"
such as that in China. See BORTON, supra note 50, at 353.
146. Cf.I. FURUNO, A SHORT HISTORY OF THE NEWS AGENCY IN JAPAN 15 (1963).
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aggerated, defeats were never reported, and in this sense it can be
said that the public was led blindly to the path of ultimate destruction and defeat while all along being firmly convinced that one
magnificent victory after another was being won."' 4 7
Thus, until after World War II Japan was characterized by an
almost complete lack of freedom of the press. Tokugawa Japan
had used the stress of Confucianism on loyalty, family welfare, and
the subordination of individual rights to reinforce the emphasis its
system placed on the group and its welfare. The Meiji Constitution
had imposed on Japan an ideology of heaven-given state rights and
state-given human rights. Although Article XXIX of the Meiji
Constitution did pay obeisance to the concept of freedom of the
press, the proviso that it could be exercised only "within the limits
of law" was used by the Japanese government as a strict control
over the press' opposition to government policies. Japan of both
the Tokugawa and Meiji eras emphasized the societal values of loyalty to one's superior, the importance of the group, and the lack of
consciousness of one's rights to make group welfare of paramount
importance at the expense of individual rights. Under these systems true freedom of the press could not exist. Thus, when the
present Japanese Constitution became effective in 1947, a constitution that strongly supports civil rights, there was little history of
protection of civil rights to guide the Japanese Supreme Court.
III.

FREEDOM OF THE PRESS UNDER THE

1947

CONSTITUTION

On November 3, 1946, a new Japanese Constitution was
promulgated; 148 it took effect May 3, 1947.1 49 The new Constitution had a totally different ideology from that of the Meiji Constitution. 5' The principle of popular sovereignty, which replaced the
147. HANE, supra note 28, at 499.
148. Technically, that document is not a "new" Japanese Constitution. It was formally
enacted as an "amendment" to the Meiji Constitution so that the links to the past were
maintained. This document, though, establishes such a vastly different governmental system
and concept of individual civil liberties than those of the Meiji Constitution that it is usually
referred to as the new Japanese Constitution. See Nathanson, ConstitutionalAdjudicationin
Japan, 7 AM. J. COMP. L. 195, 217 (1958).
149. Some observers argue that the 1947 Constitution was "imposed" upon Japan by
General Douglas MacArthur acting as Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP).
One commentator, for example, has written that the present Japanese Constitution is "in
almost all cases substantially identical in content, style, and wording" to the earlier draft
version written by SCAP. Ward, supra note 2, at 1008.
150. Reform of the Meiji Constitution was necessitated by Japan's acceptance of the
Potsdam Declaration, a joint declaration by the United States, the United Kingdom, and
China (later joined by the U.S.S.R.) on July 26, 1945. This document stated the terms for
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Meiji doctrine of imperial sovereignty,'' is immediately apparent
upon examination of the new Constitution. The Preamble declares
that "we, the Japanese people . . . do proclaim that sovereign
power resides with the people and do firmly establish this Constitution."' 5 2 Furthermore, Article I states that the "Emperor shall be
the symbol of the State and of the unity of the people, deriving his
position from the will of the people with whom reside sovereign
53
power." 1
The 1947 Constitution significantly enhanced the freedom of
the Japanese press. There are two reasons for this increased freedom. First, the new Constitution places a strong emphasis on fundamental human rights. Article 21 guarantees the freedom of the
press and prohibits censorship. Article 11 states that the "fundamental human rights guaranteed to the people by this Constitution
shall be conferred upon the people of this and future generations as
eternal and inviolate rights." 54 The Imperial Message that accompanied the enactment of the Constitution emphasized the important place that such human rights as freedom of the press occupy 5in
5
the system of government established by the new Constitution.'
The second reason for the increased freedom is that the new
Constitution established the Japanese Supreme Court as a court of
last resort with the power of constitutional review.' 56 Article 81
echoes Chief Justice John Marshall's opinion in Marbury v.
Madison 1' in giving the Japanese Supreme Court the power to
"determine the constitutionality of any law, order, regulation, or
official act." The independence of the judiciary is protected by the
new Constitution and the courts are given complete judicial
Japan's unconditional surrender in World War II. The Japanese government had to "remove all obstacles to the revival and strengthening of democratic tendencies among the Japanese people," and had to establish in Japan "respect for the fundamental human rights."
See Tanaka, A Historyof the Constitution ofJapanof 1946, in Tanaka, supra note 87, at 65354.
151. Maki, The Japanese ConstitutionalStyle, in THE CONSTITUTION OF JAPAN, supra
note 7, at 11.
152. Blaustein & Flanz, supra note 1,at I.
153. Id. at 1.
154. Id. at 2.
155. The Imperial Message declared that the new Constitution "represents a complete
revision of the imperial constitution. It seeks the basis of national reconstruction in the universal principles of mankind. It explicitly stipulates . . . that having constant regard to the
fundamental human rights, the people of Japan will conduct the national affairs on the fixed
line of democracy .... " Official Gazette, extra, November 3, 1946.
156. KENPO (Constitution) art. 76 (Japan), in Blaustein & Flanz, supra note 1,at 6.
157. 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803).
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power.158 The 1947 Constitution is declared to be the supreme law
of the land; any governmental act contrary to it is invalid. 5 9 The
cumulative effect of these provisions is to give to the Japanese
Supreme Court the power to declare invalid governmental statutes
or acts that impinge on the freedom of news reporters as guaranteed by Article 12. In contrast, under the Meiji Constitution, the
courts had no power of review over governmental acts. The "freedoms" enumerated in the Meiji Constitution were really not freedoms at all, since they could only be exercised to the degree
permitted by the government.
The freedoms and rights guaranteed by the 1947 Constitution
are not without limitation. For instance, Article 12 declares that
the people shall utilize the freedoms and rights for "the public welfare." ' 6' Thus, the Constitutional freedoms are sacrosant as long as
they are consistent with the public welfare. When they are not, the
Japanese Supreme Court has balanced the two and invariably interpreted the 1947 Constitution to read that the public welfare standard is superior.' 6' The public welfare standard is a continuation
of the group welfare concept that predominated Japan during the
Tokugawa and Meiji Constitution periods. The Japanese Supreme
Court has chosen to apply this traditional value and standard despite the wide range of new and specific rights and freedoms enumerated in the 1947 Constitution. 162 In balancing, the Court has
chosen to reaffirm the traditional value of group welfare at the expense of freedom of news reporters, a Western value newly introduced into Japan. In 1952, for example, the issue at stake was the
right of a newspaper reporter, Ishii Kiyoshi, to refuse to testify
about his source of news.' 6 3 Ishii, a reporter for the Matsumoto
branch office of the Asahi Shimbun, was told by a source that the
local police planned to arrest an official of the Matsumoto Tax Office, Seki Itaro, on the charge of corruption. The government, believing that secrets about the Seki investigation had been divulged
16 4
to reporter Ishii in violation of the National Public Service Law
158. KENPO (Constitution) art. 76 (Japan), in Blaustein & Flanz, supra note 1, at 6.
159. Id. art. 98, in Blaustein & Flanz, supra note 1, at 8.
160. Id. at 2
161. Cf. Ito, supra note 11, at 221.
162. Public welfare is a value long held in Japanese society, despite the guarantee of
freedom of the press-and the consequential rights granted to news reporters by this guarantee-described in the 1947 Constitution. Id.
163. Supreme Court, Decision of August 6, 1952, Keishe 6-8-974. For an English translation of the case, see MAKI, supra note 17, at 38.
164. Article 100 of that law states that "any public service official shall not leak any of
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(since no information about the Seki matter had yet been revealed
by the government) opened an investigation.
Ishii was called to testify in court concerning the name of his
source. 165 He argued that although the Japanese Code of Criminal
Procedure does not include reporters among those who have the
right to refuse to answer questions in court, 16 6 the secrecy of his
source of information is guaranteed by the freedom of expression
and of the press found in Article 21 of the Constitution.167 Therefore, cases in which a reporter refuses to testify regarding his source
of information fall under Article 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure which provides that witnesses can refuse to testify if they
have "due reason."
The Japanese Supreme Court, sitting Grand Bench, 68 disagreed. The Court unanimously held that reporters have no special
guarantee of freedom of expression and no privilege to refuse to
testify regarding the identity of news sources. 169 As it has typically
done in cases involving questions of individual rights and the public welfare clause,' 7 ° the Court balanced the guarantees of Article
the secret information to which he or she has gained access through his or her performance
of official duties ....
165. See note 163 supra.
166. See Article 147 of the Code of Criminal Procedure which states:
A witness may refuse to answer any question which may tend to incriminate
the following persons:
(1) The spouse, a relative by blood within the third degree of relationship or
a relative by affinity within the second degree of relationship of the witness, or a
person who was in any of such relationships to the witness;
(2) The guardian, supervisor of guardianship, or curator of the witness.
(3) A person of whom the witness is the guardian, supervisor of guardianship, or curator.
167. d.
168. The Japanese Supreme Court consists of fifteen justices. The Court conducts hearings and renders decisions through either a petty bench court or a grand (i.e., full) bench.
The petty benches are three in number and each consists of five justices. Anicle 10 of the
Saiban Shoho (Court Organization Law, Law No. 59, 1947) determines which cases are to be
handled by the Grand Bench and which by the Petty Bench. In the following instances,
though, the Grand Bench must sit:
(1) Cases in which a determination is made of the constitutionality of a law,
ordinance, regulation, or disposition as a result of a litigant's contention (excluding
those cases in which the opinion is the same as that of a previous Grand Bench
decision holding such a law, ordinance, regulation, or disposition to be constitutional);
(2) cases other than those previously mentioned in the preceding item when
the law, ordinance, regulation, or disposition in question is held to be unconstitutional;
(3) cases in which an opinion regarding the interpretation and application of
the Constitution or of any other law or ordinance is contrary to that of a previous

Supreme Court decision.
169. See note 162 supra.
170. See THE CONSTITUTION OF JAPAN, supra note 7, at 205.
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21 against the public welfare standard-and found for the public
welfare. The Court stated that a reporter cannot refuse to testify
concerning the identity of his source since the duty to testify is "indispensable to the proper operation of the judicial process, which is
of the highest importance to the public welfare."'' The Court declared that Article 21, which guarantees freedom of the press, creates for news reporters no special rights concerning their duty to
testify in court. For any such
special privilege to exist, it must be
72
declared by the legislature.
Six years later, in 1958, the Japanese Supreme Court was again
confronted with a clash between the standard of freedom of the
press and that of the public welfare. Again, the public welfare standard emerged triumphant.' 7 3 While a burglary and murder case
was being tried in the Kushiro District Court a reporter for The
Hokkaido Times took pictures of the defendant in open court, contrary to the instructions of the Chief Justice. The reporter was
charged with violating the Act for the Maintenance of Order in
Court' 7 4 and argued that the reporting of facts by the press (including the taking of pictures in court) is guaranteed by the freedom of
the press declaration found in the Constitution. The Japanese
Supreme Court disagreed, and held that the freedom of news reporters as defined by Article 21 is not an unlimited one; it must,
said the Court, always be utilized for the public welfare. '75 Therefore, information-collecting and information-reporting activities of
news reporters which disturb the order of trials are not permitted.
News reporters, even in the exercise of their very functions, cannot
interfere with the public welfare.
MAKI, supra note 17, at 42.
172. Subsequent efforts by Japanese interests to have a statutory newsman's privilege
established have been ineffectual. See Beer, Freedom of Information and the Evidentiary Use

171.

of Film in Japan. Law and Sociopolitics in an East Asian Democracy, 65 AM. POL. Sci: REV.

1119, 1123 (1971). The holding in this case presaged by twenty years that of Branzburg v.
Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972), in which the United States Supreme Court held that the First
Amendment gives to the press no special right to refuse to testify before state or federal
grand juries.
173. Supreme Court, Decision of February 17, 1956, Keisho 12-2-255.
174. Law Concerning the Maintenance of Order in Court, Etc., Law No. 286 of 1952.
175. The Japanese Supreme Court is not the only court in Japan to emphasize this point.
In 1963, for example, the Tokyo District Court held that the freedoms guaranteed under
Article 21 (such as freedom of the press) are not unlimited. They are subject to "rational
restrictions" in order to establish the "public welfare." Tokyo District Court, Decision of
December 20, 1963, Hanrei Jiho 359-96; noted in Brown, Government Secrecy and the "Peoples Right to Know" in Japan Implicationsof the Nishiyama Case, in 10 LAW IN JAPAN: AN
ANNUAL

112, 120 (1977).

Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons,

25

California Western
International Law Journal, Vol. 11, No. 2 [], Art. 2
CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

Vol. I I

The Japanese Supreme Court has not restricted the freedom of
news reporters in all cases. In fact, the Court has been a staunch
defender of reporters' freedom when it has not clashed with the
public welfare. In the case referred to by many legal scholars as the
Kochi defamation matter, 11 6 a case whose holding closely resembles that of the United States Supreme Court in New York Times v.
Sullivan, 7 7 the Japanese Supreme Court (sitting Grand Bench)
unanimously recognized a large degree of press freedom against
claims by individuals that they had been defamed in newspaper
articles. 7' 8
The case began in February, 1963, when the Yukan Wakayama
Jili newspaper published a series of articles about Sakaguchi
Tokuichiro, the publisher of an allegedly sensationalist newspaper.
The articles were titled "The Sins of the Vampire Sakaguchi
Tokuichiro." In the title of the articles Sakaguchi's given name
Tokuichiro was subjected to a play on Japanese characters such
that the character in his name meaning virtue,
"toku," was replaced
179
by a homonym meaning gain or profit.
An article on February 18 alleged that Sakaguchi had told
public officials in Wakayama that stories in his newspaper that
would put the officials in a negative public light would not be
printed if Sakaguchi was paid money in return. The publisher of
the Yukan Wakayama J.ii, Kochi Katsuyoshi, was prosecuted for
defamation under Article 230(1) of the Criminal Code. t80 That
statute provides that "a person who defames another by publicly
alleging facts shall, regardless of whether such facts are true or
false, be punished. . .""' Kochi was convicted by the Wakayama
District Court. The Osaka High Court sustained the conviction.
On appeal, though, the Supreme Court's Grand Bench unanimously reversed the judgment.
After engaging in a careful balancing test, the Supreme Court
decided that there should be a large degree of press freedom in such
cases. The Court weighed the protection of the individual's good
176. Supreme Court, Decision of June 25, 1969, Keisho 23-7-259. See also THE CONSTISELECTED SUPREME COURT DECISIONS, 1961-70 175 (H.
Itoh & L. Beer eds. 1976) for an English translation of the case [hereinafter cited as Itoh &
Beer].
177. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
178. See Itoh & Beer, supra 176.
179. 1d. at 176 n.*.
180. See note 176 supra.
181. See Beer, supra note 118, at 195.
TUTIONAL CASE LAW OF JAPAN -
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name on the one hand and the guarantee of freedom of the press on
the other. The Court said that even if the statements of the newspaper are false, the crime of defamation is not present if the defendant
can prove two points: (1) the defendant believed the statements to
be true, and (2) the evidence shows there was sufficient reason for
this mistaken belief." 2 Therefore, evidence at the trial that had
been ruled hearsay and inadmissible by the trial judge that a third
party (i.e., a news "source") had provided the defendant with information that was printed in the article and which the source had
heard from officials
at Wakayama City Hall was improperly struck
83
from the record.

In this case the Japanese Supreme Court balanced against the
protection of an individual's good name not only the constitutional
standard of freedom of the press but also that of the public welfare.
The added element of the public welfare standard may have been
the determining factor that tipped the scales in favor of freedom of
the press. This opinion strenghtens freedom of the press and of
news reporters by holding that untrue statements by news reporters
do not now expose a newspaper to charges of defamation as long as
the two-pronged test stated above is met. The public welfare,
though, is also furthered by the decision in this case. By its holding,
the Japanese Supreme Court allowed the press to use their knowledge and ability to serve the Japanese people by reporting the news
freely. In this way many viewpoints on issues can be expressed,
and the electorate can be better informed. 84
' This served the public
welfare by assuring potential voters that reporting would not be inhibited as long as there was a reasonable and honest belief by the
reporter that the article was true. A contrary decision by the Court
would have prevented reporters from reporting on the people in
the news unless there was absolute proof that what they were reporting was true. Information from sources would not have been
printed unless it was checked and double-checked to insure its accuracy. Not only could information from sources now be printed in
newspapers without the paper being liable for defamation (as long
as the reporter had sufficient reason to believe the information to be
true), but in 1977 the Tokyo High Court took this holding one step
182. Itoh & Beer, supra note 176, at 177.
183. Id.
184. The Japanese press is an integral part of the electoral process in Japan, because
Japan has the highest literacy rate in the world. Cf. Halloran, Japan: Images and Realities,
in POSTWAR JAPAN-1945 TO THE PRESENT 381 (J. Livingston, J. Moore, & F. Oldfather eds.
1973).
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further and ruled that unless an advertisement defamed a party, the
party had no right
to require the newspaper to publish its rebuttal
85
free of charge.
In 1969 another conflict between the Constitution's guarantee
of freedom of the press and the public welfare standard developed. 8 6 Predictably, the public welfare provision emerged triumphant. Although the case involved the freedom of a television
station, its language and reasoning are clearly analogous to the situations involving newspapers. The case was based on an order by
the Fukuoka District Court requiring four television stations to
turn over to the court their film of an incident at Hakata Station.
That incident took place on January 16, 1968, and involved activist
students who had demonstrated against the visit to Japan of the
U.S.S. Enterprise, an American nuclear-powered aircraft carrier.
Detained at Hakata Station by the police, the students sued the Prefectural Police Commissioner and others for abuse of police authority. After the television companies refused to present the film as
evidence to the Court, the Fukuoka District Court issued an order
compelling its production. The companies appealed the order to
the Supreme Court as a violation of freedom of the press.
The press had by now learned how much weight the Japanese
Supreme Court placed on the public welfare standard of the Constitution. Accordingly, the television companies argued that the
public welfare could be guaranteed only by a decision in their
favor. The companies asserted that to protect fully their freedom to
report the news, their freedom to gather news also had to be guaranteed. They argued that if they were compelled to turn over these
films to the lower court, public confidence in the press would be
diminished since the product of the companies' news reporting activities would be used for purposes other than that of simply reporting the news. As the public lost confidence in the press, the
electorate would rely less and less on the press for the reporting of
the news. The electorate's ability to reach a decision on the issues
would thus be deleteriously affected, and the public welfare would
be the ultimate loser as 7 the press lost its most valuable asset--the
8
trust of its consumers.1
185. Tokyo District Court, Decision of July 13, 1977, Hanrei Jiha 857-30.
186. Supreme Court, Decision of November 21, 1969, Keisho 23-11-1490. For English
translations of the case, see Tanaka, supra note 87, at 742, and Itoh & Beer, supra note 176,
at 249.
187. Id.
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Sitting as the Grand Bench a unanimous Court rejected this
argument. Once again the Court reminded the press that its rights
under the Japanese Constitution were not absolute. The Court
stated that the guarantee of a fair trial was more important to the
public welfare than the press' freedom.' 8 8 The films possessed by
the four television companies were necessary as evidence to secure
a fair criminal trial. The Court asserted that in this case the public
welfare was better served by seeing that all evidence indispensable
to determining the guilt or innocence of the defendants was produced than by protecting the freedom of the press to gather
89

news. 1

Once again the Court held that freedom of the press (albeit
television stations and not newspapers) must yield to the public
welfare. The press had by now learned the primacy to the Japanese
Supreme Court of the public welfare standard: it had couched its
argument in those terms. The Court, though, had held that the interest to society of a fair criminal trial-with its concomitant guarantee that all necessary evidence would be available for protection
at trial-outweighed the freedom of the press.' 9° After this decision and that involving reporter Ishii,' 9' it appears likely that a
court in Japan would be able to order a news reporter to turn over
his notes and other material concerning a story if those notes are
necessary evidence at a criminal trial.
In 1978 another case arose which involved the standards of
freedom of the press and the public welfare. 192 However, in this
case the Japanese Supreme Court stated that the two constitutional
standards were not in opposition but rather on the same side. The
case concerned a political reporter Nishiyama Takichi, who had
obtained previously secret cablegrams involved in the negotiations
over Okinawa between Japan and the United States. Nishiyama
had obtained these cablegrams from Mrs. Hasumi Kazuo, secretary
to Deputy Foreign Vice Minister Takeshi Yasukawa. Hasumi was
prosecuted for the crime of divulging classified secret information
188. id.
189. The Court did appease the press somewhat in stating that the press was required to
turn over evidence for use at court only if the necessity and value of the material for use at
trial outweighed the degree to which freedom in news-gathering by the press would be hindered by the presentation in court of the material. See Tanaka, supra note 87, at 742, and
Itoh & Beer, supra note 176, at 249.
190. Id.
191. MAKI, supra note 17, at 38.
192. Supreme Court, Decision of May 31, 1978.
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as provided for in the national Public Employees Act. 193 Reporter
Nishiyama was charged with the crime of instigation under Article
11 1 of the same law, which provides a criminal penalty for one inducing a civil servant to commit a crime.' 94
The Supreme Court's decision in this case is important in several respects. Although it did leave several questions unresolved,
the Court did stress the importance of the press in Japan by stating
that news reports serve the public's right to know by helping fully
inform the people about the government's activities. More importantly, however, the Court opened to the press sources of news concerning the government that were previously unavailable by
expanding its definition of the parameters of the lawful activities of
the press.195 In striking language the Court argued that the press'
role in keeping the people informed is so important that its efforts
to obtain information concerning governmental activities "necessarily" involve attempts to expose governmental secrets. The Court
cast very strong doubt on whether in the ordinary course of a reporter's activities that reporter could be prosecuted under Article
11 1 of the National Public Employees Act for inciting a civil servant to commit a crime by divulging classified information, the
very crime for which Nishiyama was prosecuted.' 9 6 The Court
stated that even if a reporter tries to acquire information about the
government by attempting to induce a public employee to disclose
confidential information, his act is not illegalper se. In fact, it is a
"justifiable act" as long as a two-pronged test is met: (1) it is motivated by what the Court stated to be a "genuine desire" to keep the
public informed, and (2) the means used by the reporter are justifiable in light of the spirit of the laws and the common sense of society. 197
What the Japanese Supreme Court did by formulating this
two-pronged test was to link the freedom of the press and of news
reporters with the public welfare in regard to the press' efforts to
reveal secret information of the government to the public. The
Court asserted that the role of the press in keeping the public informed is so crucial to the public welfare that as long as its actions
193. See note 164 supra.
194. Article Ill of the National Public Employees Act declares that "a person who has
attempted, ordered, deliberately acquiesced, instigated, or abetted any of the acts mentioned
. . . shall be punished with the penalty provided in respectively in those Articles."
195. See note 192 supra.
196. Id.
197. Id.
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are "justifiable," the press can even induce government employees
to reveal confidential information (i.e., induce them to commit an
illegal act).'
Apparently, the Court believes that the public welfare is better served by having an informed public than by seeing
that government secrets are kept confidential.
The opinion does, however, leave several issues unresolved.
First, what of the reporter's source, the government employee? 9 9 If
the reporter is justified in inducing the employee to violate the law,
then should the employee, the revealer of the secret information,
still be criminally liable for violating the National Public Employees Act? 2°° Are the motives of the employee relevant? Second, in
this case the Court did ultimately sustain Nishiyama's conviction
on the ground that his acts were unjustifiable, that the means employed by him exceeded the proper limits of news-gathering activities in light of the spirit of the law and the common sense of
society. 20 ' But is the reporter's conduct really relevant? If the role
of the press in keeping the public informed is as essential to the
public welfare as the Court said it was in this case, then aren't the
acts of a reporter justified per se if he does reveal governmental
information to the public? Third, the Court declared that the activities of the reporter in seeking to persuade others to disclose confidential information are lawful, inter alia, if the means used by the
reporter are justifiable "in light of the spirit of the laws and the
common sense of society. ' 2°2 What does this standard mean in actuality? Fourth, no matter how pure its motives, is the press indeed
justified in revealing information to the public that the government
has decided should be confidential? Arguendo the reporter's motive
and means are justifiable, can the press now reveal any confidential
information to the public by rationalizing that it is in the public's
interest to be informed about these matters-no matter how important it is to the government to keep the material secret? 20 3 Are any
198. Id.
199. This issue was not before the Supreme Court, since the appeal to the Court involved
only the acts of the reporter Nishiyama. See Brown, supra note 175, at 113-14.
200. See note 164 supra.
201. The Supreme Court found it outrageous that, as the trial testimony revealed, reporter Nishiyama had seduced Mrs. Hasumi with the sole objective of using her to obtain the
secret documents and that as soon as he achieved his purpose he ended his relationship with
her.
202. See note 191 supra.
203. In New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 726 (1971), Mr. Justice
Brennan, an ardent advocate of freedom of the press, wrote that the press would not be
justified, in revealing military secrets.
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government secrets immune from disclosure in the press after this
case? These issues will surely confront the Japanese Supreme
Court in the future.
These unresolved questions aside, the significance of the
Nishiyama case should not be underestimated. Arguendo that the
reporter is motivated by a genuine desire to keep the public informed and that the means he uses are justifiable, the Japanese
Supreme Court has ruled that the role of the news reporter in helping to keep the electorate informed by gathering and reporting
news is so crucial to a democracy that the public welfare is better
served by his revelation of information deemed confidential by the
government than it is by safeguarding the secrecy of the information and the government's decision to keep it confidential through
criminal prosecution of the reporter. The Court did state that these
two constitutional standards, those of freedom of the press and the
public welfare, were not in opposition in that case but rather went
hand-in-hand. Thus, the case has great portent for the future. If
the Court persists in finding these two values to be on the same side
in future balancing tests, it will necessarily mean an expansion of
the press' freedom and that of news reporters. Since the Japanese
Supreme Court has so consistently held the public welfare to be of
paramount importance in the Constitution's set of values, any
Court held tie-in between freedom of the press and the public welfare can only lead to an expanded interpretation of the former.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Despite the broad guarantee of freedom of the press found in
the 1947 Constitution-and the corresponding rights granted to
news reporters by this guarantee-the Japanese Supreme Court has
chosen to emphasize the primacy of the group welfare standard described in Article 12 of the Constitution. This writer believes that
the reason for this stems from the history and traditions of Japan.
As we have seen, before the enactment of the 1947 Constitution the
wide range of specific rights, freedoms, and immunities described
in that document were unfamiliar to Japan. Not only were these
freedoms not known to Japan, but the social, legal, and governmental systems of the last four centuries had emphasized the welfare of
the group at the expense of individual rights. When Occidental
ideas of individual freedoms were abruptly put into effect in Japan
by the present Constitution, a Japan lacking in a tradition of civil
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liberties was suddenly confronted with what one could say was a
veritable plethora of them.
Despite these broad constitutional freedoms the Japanese
Supreme Court has continued to stress the traditional Japanese
value of the primacy of the group over the rights of reporters. Unlike the United States Supreme Court, the Japanese Supreme Court
played no significant role in the evolution of civil liberties in its
country. Prior to 1947 the Japanese Supreme Court had never defended an individual's right against encroachment by the state.2
Perhaps the lack of an important role for the Japanese Supreme
Court in the evolution of civil liberties in Japan has caused the
Court to move slowly. One writer has suggested that "the rights,
such as freedom of the press, were mere "givens" under the postwar
Constitution and hence were not appreciated5 in the same way as
20
when rights are "won" through legal tests.
It is my belief that the reason for the lack of protection for
freedom of the press has to do with the strength of the value of the
primacy of the group in the Japanese ethos. Apparently, the Court
believes that the new concept of civil liberties so abruptly introduced into Japan by the 1947 Constitution should not mean the
abandonment of such long-standing values as the importance of the
group welfare. The Court has seemingly assigned to itself the task
of preserving the traditional group welfare value of Japan while at
the same time taking steps to insure that the constitutional rights of
news reporters suffer no fundamental damage. When the public
welfare standard and freedom of the press are not in opposition but
rather on the same side, the Court has not hesitated to expand the
rights of news reporters (its decision in the reporter Nishiyama case
has apparently greatly enhanced the ability of reporters to reveal
hitherto secret government matters to the public).
It is important to remember that while the Japanese Supreme
Court has invariably held the public welfare standard to be superior to that of the freedom of the press, the Court has not unduly
restricted the rights of news reporters. Only since 1947 has freedom
for news reporters truely existed in Japan. In its decisions since
then, the Court has acted to preserve the traditional Japanese value
of the primacy of the group welfare while at the same time seeing
that freedom for news reporters does exist in Japan. None of the
204. Kim, Consiftution and Obscenity: Japan andthe U.S.A., 23 AM. J. COMP. L. 255, 265
(1975).
205. Brown, supra note 175, at 115 n.10.
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decisions of the Japanese Supreme Court since the enactment of the
1947 Constitution smack of censorship or strict controls over the
press. Instead of criticizing the Court for not breaking with the
Japanese traditional value of the public welfare and being more
assertive of the freedom of the press, perhaps it is better to laud the
Court for protecting the freedom of the press and news reporters
enshrined in the 1947 Constitution while it maintains the values
traditionally held by the Japanese. The Court has acted to guard
that the rights of news reporters incur no fundamental damage
while at the same time insuring that the presence of this new civil
liberty in Japanese jurisprudence does not signify an end to the
traditional Japanese value of the primacy of the public's welfare.
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